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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 July 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)  
Colonel H. J. Lemley, Jr., USA (AC/SI)  
Captain W. S. Howell, USN (ONI)  
Colonel W. B. Sawyer, USAF (AFOIN 2B2)  
Colonel C. H. Dayhuff, Jr., USA (JIG)

SUBJECT: Validity Study on NIE 31-2-55: YUGOSLAVIA

1. Attached is a Validity Study on NIE 31-2-55 for your consideration in connection with NIE 31-56: YUGOSLAVIA's INTERNATIONAL POSITION. The Board of National Estimates recommends that there be no Post Mortem.

2. It is requested that your representative meet with us at 10:00 a.m., Thursday, 19 July, in Room 115 Administration Building, to discuss this estimate. Please note this meeting time indicates a change from the last notice.

*W. Allen P. Bundy*  
WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 July 1956

SUBJECT: Validity Study on NIE 31-2-55, "YUGOSLAVIA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION," approved 7 September 1955

1. This estimate, written from the vantage point of September 1955, was a little too cautious, but was essentially valid as of the time it was written. It placed more stress on Tito's desire to maintain a flexible middle position between the two major power blocs than we do at present in the light of recent developments. However, it emphasized that the development of Yugoslav-Bloc ties would continue and indicated that this process would probably include "cautious moves toward re-establishment of party-to-party ties." It also pointed out that "insofar as the USSR proved willing to accord Yugoslavia a real voice in Communist affairs, and as a necessary corollary to permit a significant weakening of its hitherto tight control over the Satellites, Yugoslavia's present leadership would probably be progressively tempted to resume a place in a Communist Bloc whose character had thus changed." Moreover, Yugoslavia's actual moves during the intervening period have not materially varied from those predicted in NIE 31-2-55. The latter's estimates of Yugoslavia's wartime value to the West and of the effect of threatened or actual reduction of US aid also have not been greatly changed in the new NIE.

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2. The principal shortcomings of NIE 31-2-55 were its failure to anticipate how far and fast the Soviet leaders would go along lines likely to reduce Yugoslav suspicions about them and how willing Yugoslavia would be to accept evidence that Soviet policy had indeed changed. Although we expected that the USSR would make continuing efforts to convince the Yugoslavs of its good faith, NIE 31-2-55 did not foresee such developments as Khrushchev's violent denunciation of Stalin at the XXth Party Congress and the ostensible loosening of Soviet control over the Satellite and non-Bloc Communist parties which has followed. These developments in fields outside the narrow scope of Yugoslav-Soviet relations per se have almost certainly done much to convince Tito and his colleagues that Soviet policy was in fact developing along lines desired by them and that there would no longer be "great personal danger" in closer relations with the USSR. On its side, Yugoslavia has accepted special bonds of friendship and common interest with the USSR without waiting for the development of a "significant" weakening of Kremlin control over the Satellites and the emergence of conditions in which Yugoslavia would have a "real voice in Communist affairs." In short, the Russians have given more and Tito has demanded somewhat less than we ~~forecast~~ in NIE 31-2-55.